It is often taken for granted that the historical path followed by developing financial centres has been more or less the same in all cases: as synthesized by Charles Kindleberger, a 'staple theory' of finance has been constructed, according to which 'banking starts out to serve the needs of sovereigns and nobles; develops in connection with commerce; then less personally with governmental finance; next with transport, including shipping, canals, turnpikes, and railroads; then with industry; and finally with intermediation in insurance, mortgages, consumer finance, factoring, pension funds, and the like'
2 . Yet, a lot of examples do not seem to fit into this linear scheme: for instance, there are important commercial hubs that never developed banking activities, while there are banking centres that were never significantly involved in financing trade or sovereign debt. In this respect, the emergence of Brussels as an international financial centre during the 19 th century is a particularly interesting case, not only because of its apparently 'atypical' course (a jump start to the industry phase), but also because of its impressively rapid success 3 . Such features make the Brussels case very relevant for a reflection on our current understanding of the determinants of financial development.
Even though many aspects of Belgian economic history have been studied in the last decades, a proper assessment of the reasons that led to the concentration of financial activities in what then was a rather peripheral city is still missing to date. This gap in the literature is perhaps to be attributed to the fact that scholars have mostly looked at this process as the natural outcome of some broader phenomena taking place at that time. On the one hand, in line with the traditional emphasis on industrialization, the process has been seen as the side effect of Belgium's economic take-off during those years 4 . On the other hand, echoing the early-20 thcentury perception of Brussels as a sort of offshore financial centre (see below), it has been interpreted as the product of laissez-faire legislation -especially the stock exchange liberalization of 1867 and the corporate law reform of 1873 5 . However, despite including many elements of truth, both interpretations fail to provide a satisfactory explanation. On the one hand, even not mentioning the fact that by the first world war Belgium was perhaps more financially advanced than any other industrial power 6 , the idea that such a development was led by real growth fails to explain why it was the then peripheral Brussels market to become the centre of Belgian industrial finance instead of any other one -most notably, the already established Antwerp market 7 . On the other hand, the timing of the process shows that laissezfaire reforms probably played a role in priming the boom of the Brussels stock exchange at the eve of the first world war, but not its first take-off in the central part of the 19 th century 8 . Figure 1 shows the number of securities listed on the official bulletin of the Brussels bourse (Cours authentique de la bourse de Bruxelles) in the years before 1870 for which this publication is available. It appears that the turning point in the centre's expansion and internationalization took place during the 1850s: while in the first half of the century domestic equities dominated the exchange, the number of foreign securities listed kept growing thereafter 9 . However, besides being unavailable for many years, this series suffers from an additional shortcoming: the fact that securities were listed does not necessarily mean that they were actually traded. Trading volumes at that time could actually be close to zero for a long time for many of the securities officially listed at the exchange. Yet volumes are impossible to assess, unless through proxies. In order to overcome this problem, the same kind of survey as in figure 1 is performed in figure 2.1 by using the listings published by Belgium's most important newspaper of the time, L'Indépendance belge: the idea is that the press provided information concerning securities actually traded on a significant scale, and omitted those lacking interest from the general public. What were the determinants of Brussels' take-off as a national and international financial centre? In the spirit of this book, this chapter aims at providing some answers by reviewing the main aspects of this process. Section 1 focuses on capital resources available on place, and on the domestic investing public. Section 2 deals with the composition of the Brussels business elite, and the connections this provided with the foreign investing public. Section 3 is about domestic regulation and taxation. Section 4 examines the performance of the national currency and the features of the domestic money market. Section 5 covers the foreign exchange market. The last section concludes.
Figures 1, 2.1, and 2.2 about here
Capital Resources and the Domestic Investing Public
When in 1822 king William I of the Netherlands started planning the foundation of a bank of issue in Brussels, an anonymous advisor warned him that 'like almost all the towns and cities of the [Southern] provinces, Brussels only possesses a manufacturing industry and consumer-10 Limited to the early 1850s, an apparent discrepancy exists between the two surveys. These years look like a period of stagnation in figure 1 , and of expansion in figure 2.1. The reason is the following. In the event of the restructuration of the banking sector that followed the 1848 crisis, many of the shares issued in the 1830s (which had hardly traded during the 1840s) were finally delisted; in the meantime, a number of new equities were floated. L'Indépendance belge had not been mentioning untraded securities since 1842, while the official bulletin had been bound to continue to do that; as a result, figure 1 only shows the balance of the substitution process between old untraded securities and newly floated ones. The consequences of this situation cannot be underestimated. interest rate of 4% was allowed on deposits up to the rather high ceiling of 4,000 francs, and money could be withdrawn with only a few days' advice 21 . The prospect of such a safe and remunerative form of investment proved successful in diverting the wealthy Belgians' capital from real estate 22 , thus enhancing for the first time the liquidity of the banking system. The influx of cash allowed SG to launch its grand underwriting policy of industrial securities, which -together with a similar move by BdB -prompted the expansion of the Brussels stock exchange in the second half of the 1830s 23 . According to Chlepner 24 , the involvement of the general public in stock trading was very limited at the time: only a rather small group of agents -mostly tied to the universal banks themselves -was apparently involved in the speculative row of 1835-1838. If we buy this thesis, then we can conclude that the way the Belgian public provided the necessary resources to the expansion of the stock exchange passed through the intermediation of the savings divisions of universal banks, rather than through direct investment in securities.
Large reliance on callable deposits, however, made banks particularly vulnerable to balance sheet mismatches in the event of crises. In 1839, the suspension of payments by BdB was only partially tied to its depositors' attitude (see figure 4 ); yet in 1848, the extent of the savers' run on SG counters alone was such a big shock on the bank's balance (see figure 3) that only the issuance of unconvertible notes allowed for its survival. This latter crisis led universal banks to a deep rethinking of their activities in deposit collection: as an eminent member of SG's post-crisis board, Jules Malou, pointed out in 1863, savings banking had to be seen as 'a way for accumulating small sums, not a way for investing already piled-up capital', as it was 'based on two mutually inconsistent ideas, productivity and almost instantaneous callability of deposits' 25 . BdB closed down its savings division in 1852, while SG lowered the ceiling for interest-bearing deposits from 4,000 to 1,500 francs. In presenting to the Parliament his plan for the foundation of CGER, the Finance Minister Frère-Orban declared that 'during the last years, and especially after 1850, the number and the size of savings banks have grown remarkably in our neighbouring countries. We are the only ones to have remained stationary since 1840 -worse still, we must admit, we have even regressed'. 27 Malou wrote his Notice in 1863, at the time the Parliament was debating on the foundation of CGER -a plan to which, in his capacity of manager of a potential competitor (i.e. SG), he was fiercely opposed (CGER, Mémorial, . As a consequence of this conflict of interests, Malou's claims about the dangers of savings banking must be probably read as a sort of veiled scaremongering. 28 Describing Belgium's financial system at the eve of the first world war, Walther Meynen pointed out that one of the peculiarities of this system rested on the degree of penetration of securities to the portfolios of almost all classes of the Belgian society, down to small savers. According to him, the general public was so wellacquainted with this kind of assets that universal banks relied on a capillary network of brokers more than on direct over-the-counter transactions with their customers, when they were to place the securities they had underwritten. Although this description refers to a much later period than the one considered in this chapter, it is reasonable to hypothesize that such an extraordinary acquaintance of the Belgian public with the bourse had its roots in the much-lamented 'disruption' of savings banking activities in the country after the 1848 crisis. This would also provide one possible explanation for the early rise of a general demand for the liberalization of brokerage activities, which led to the 1867 reform of the Brussels stock exchange (see below). Walther Meynen, Das belgische Bankwesen (Berlin: Siemenroth, 1910), pp. 57-58. 29 Chlepner, La banque, p. 94, bases his thesis on a article published by L'Indépendance belge (26 th September 1836), stating that 'shares issued by our joint-stock companies are far from being as widespread as people could think; some days ago, a Brussels newspaper admitted that in Antwerp -which is nonetheless at our gates -they were hardly known'. Yet since January 1837 Antwerp's most important financial newspaper, Journal du commerce d'Anvers, regularly published the prices of industrial equities listed at the Brussels bourse -which means that public interest on these securities was growing beyond the capital's city walls.
To sum up, during its first two decades as an independent State, Belgium found itself with a rather peculiar banking structure: savings collection was very early centralized by universal banks, which applied these resources to the underwriting business in the industrial sector.
This enhanced the first development of the Brussels stock exchange, but also exposed banks to the risk of violent balance sheet mismatches -which eventually took place in 1839 and 1848. After the latter crisis, universal banks imposed more penalising conditions on large deposits, thus encouraging the direct placement of these funds to securities. Nevertheless, the aggressive savings-collection policy enacted by banks during the 1830s and 1840s succeeded in mobilizing the capital of the Belgian middle class, which proved to be an irreversible process. When a new underwriting wave took place in the 1850s, a domestic reservoir of liquid funds was by then available to be invested in newly-issued securities.
Business Elites (and the Foreign Investing Public)
One striking aspect of the first expansion of the Brussels stock exchange during the 1830s is the fact that it took place in a rather insulated environment. This is reflected by the scarcity of connections between the local business elite and outer banking networks. Before the foundation of the first joint-stock banks, Brussels was host to a handful of private banks, mostly devoted to trade-related activities on a very small scale 30 . Together with some entrepreneurs, landowners, and politicians, these local bankers formed the bulk of the administrations of universal banks 31 . The Paris Rothschild house had appointed a permanent agent in Belgium's capital city, but his activities were mostly related to the management of the country's public debt 32 . Thus the financial elite that made the 1830s boom (and bust) was almost exclusively Brussels-based. These very circumstances provide perhaps the best explanation for the fact that the floatation of new Belgian industrial equities was enacted in contacts with the outer world, the closed and inward-looking elite that controlled the two universal banks had no other chance than developing the local equity market in order to be able to manage the process properly. To sum up, while the very first expansion of the Brussels bourse in the 1830s took place in a sort of vacuum -foreign players, as it was the case for the Rothschilds, mainly intervened through the intermediation of domestic agents -, the second wave of financial growth in the 1850s happened in an environment that was much more interconnected with the international financial system. Although the structure of the domestic financial system did not change substantially -Belgian universal banks continued to dominate the market -, the evolution in the composition of the local business elite opened new transmission channels between Belgium's capital city and the most important foreign places. This process laid the basis for the internationalization of the Brussels stock exchange -which was to reach extraordinary levels at the beginning of the 20 th century.
Regulation and Taxation
As it has been already pointed out, scholars have put much emphasis on the 1867 and 1873 reforms as the main steps of a process of full liberalization that, combined with the absence of corporate taxes on revenues and dividends, allegedly led to the expansion of the Brussels A quick look at the regulatory framework during the first years of life of the Kingdom of Belgium seems to suggest that the impact of the liberalization process of the 1860s and 1870s
has probably been overestimated. Since the Napoleonic age and throughout the Dutch period, the country had stuck to the Code de Commerce -which provided it with an internationally recognized legal standard adopted by the whole Continental region that had previously joined the French Empire. The Code imposed rather strict rules on brokerage activities (a monopoly of agents appointed by the political power) and on incorporation (subject to governmental authorisation). Yet it does not seem that this legislation ever really threatened to harm the growth of financial activities. On the one hand, the brokers' monopoly was systematically circumvented through the development of a curb market (viz. the so-called Lloyd bruxellois,
the Brussels equivalent to the Paris coulisse) 40 . On the other hand, formal governmental control proved rather ineffective in restraining incorporations, especially during the 1830s:
even in the few cases in which attempts in this sense were made, companies went public anyway before authorisation was granted (as in the famous case of Mutualité Industrielle) 41 .
Last but not least, in the decades of our concern neither was income taxation levied (as in most other European countries, except Britain and Austria) 42 , nor were capital controls ever established.
To sum up, the traditional depiction of Brussels as an early offshore financial centre can be effective in explaining its exceptional early-20 th -century growth, not its first take-off in the mid-19 th century. Rather than an abolition of restrictive regulation, the 1867 and 1873 reforms should be read as a reconciliation between legislation on the one hand, and a practice that had grown far beyond formal limits on the other hand. 40 Chlepner, Le marché, pp. 46-47. The practice was so much dethatched from the letter that even official actors systematically circumvented the law. For instance, in order to prevent any sort of conflicts of interests, the Code de Commerce strictly forbade brokers to transact operations on their own account; however, the proceedings of the Administration Board of the NBB report that in January 1852, the Bank illegally discounted an amount of bills to broker François Depouhon. A very controversial protagonist of the Brussels business life (Gille, Lettres, passim), Depouhon would later on become a director of the NBB itself. biggest banks 46 . The boost given by the new bank of issue is impressive: the overall supply of credit to the acceptance market increased more than fivefold in the space of a decade 47 . Such a result was made possible by the penetration of the NBB in the provinces (see figure 9 ):
through the creation of a large network of local branches (twenty-five provincial offices, plus the Brussels and Antwerp headquarters, were operating by 1860), the Bank enhanced the development of peripheral money markets, which had suffered in the previous decades from their isolation with respect to the core centres 48 . Such a penetration was easily enacted by the Bank through the diffusion of its banknotes, as fiduciary circulation had largely been underdeveloped in the provinces up to that moment. As a result of this process, within a decade from the NBB's foundation a truly national and centralized monetary system had finally been established in Belgium.
To sum up, the creation of the NBB gave a substantial contribution to the emergence of the Brussels financial centre not because it merely granted convertibility, but because it boosted the development of a larger and deeper domestic money market, which provided financial activities with a steady flow of funds 49 . Moreover, the Bank's active discount policy proved successful in keeping domestic interest rates at lower levels than abroad, which no doubts made Belgium an attractive place for foreign borrowers. The way this result was achieved will be dealt with in the next section.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 about here 46 Figure 7 , showing the yearly volume of bills discounted by the Belgium's three biggest banks, provides the best indicator of the amount of credit supplied by the banking system to the economy. However, the series suffers from two flaws: a) data for BdB are missing for some years (1835, 1839, 1849, and 1850) , and b) data for NBB include bills rediscounted with it by universal banks, so that the total volume of commercial paper discounted could be overestimated. In order to rule out the possibility that these shortcomings create major distortion in the overall picture, this is complemented by the complete series of end-of-year commercial portfolios for the three banks (figure 8). The two figures are mutually consistent. 47 However, it must be bore in mind that these sums also include bills denominated in foreign currencies discounted by Belgian banks (see below). 48 While big industrial plants had always had their bills discounted by universal banks in Brussels, smaller provincial firms had long been denied access to credit at the same conditions as metropolitan concerns. As a matter of fact, SG had mostly made use of its country branches for collecting savings rather than providing credit. In the end, the complaints of provincial borrowers provided one of the main arguments in favour of the foundation of a new bank of issue (Chlepner, La banque, . 49 The fact that bills payable in another corner of the country would always be eligible for discount at the NBB provided a national standard that encouraged private short-term investment in acceptances throughout Belgium: in other words, the Bank's action was effective not only on the demand side, but also on the supply side of the domestic money market.
The Foreign Exchange Market
Among the main tasks envisaged for the newborn NBB, Finance Minister Frère-Orban included the creation of a large foreign exchange market in Belgium. This was meant to sustain the growth of the country's weight in international commerce: up to that moment, many foreign transactions had to be cleared via London or Paris, which implied extra costsand a loss of competitiveness -for Belgian traders 50 . The NBB actually proved very eager to enter the foreign exchange market, although mainly for a different reason than fulfilling the Frère-Orban's expectations: as a matter of fact, playing with foreign currencies provided the Bank with the means for both boosting its revenues and smoothing the effects of external shocks on its own discount policy. All this ultimately allowed the NBB to keep lower domestic interest rates than abroad -as observed in the previous section 51 .
These aspects of the NBB's policy have received little attention up to now, but archival sources provide much information on the Bank's astonishingly sophisticated action 52 . Figure   10 shows that a large share of the bills discounted by the NBB were payable abroad. While almost the totality of bills denominated in Belgian francs were taken from the Belgian public, most of the bills denominated in foreign currencies were purchased abroad through the Bank's correspondents 53 -which proves that support to the foreign exchange market in Belgium was definitely not the driving force behind the NBB's policy. Yet this does not mean that the public was not benefiting from the Bank's action. advantageous instrument for exporters. But there is more: figure 11 also shows that for quite a long period, the NBB applied a lower discount rate for 'international' bills denominated in Belgian francs (i.e. claims drawn on Belgium by a foreign agent) than for 'fully domestic' bills (i.e. claims drawn on Belgium by a Belgian agent). This means that since the beginning of its operations, the Bank was very keen on imposing an upper bound to the offshore interest rate on Belgian francs 54 , which acted as a cap on refinancing costs for foreign borrowers in Belgian currency. Last but not least, the Bank was also offering dealers in foreign currencies an additional instrument: repurchase agreements (i.e. the Bank bought foreign bills spot to resell them forward). As the repo rate was generally pegged to the Bank's 'international' discount rate -and was thus often lower than the onshore market rate on the concerned currency -holders of foreign claims (like e.g. exporters) found it more advantageous to borrow on their security at the NBB rather than to discount them in the open market. As firstclass foreign merchant banks were also admitted to contract repos, this instrument must have played a role in enhancing the diffusion of the Belgian franc abroad.
To sum up, even though the NBB's involvement in foreign exchange operations was mostly dictated by other concerns than smoothing international transactions, the Bank's action proved substantial in providing the necessary infrastructure for the emergence of a foreign exchange market in Brussels. By reducing the cost of transactions to and from Belgium, the Bank boosted the competitiveness of the Belgian franc as an international means of payment, thus laying the path towards its assumption of a first-stage role in the late 19 th century 55 .
Figures 10 and 11 about here 54 Of course, as no capital controls existed at the time, the offshore and onshore interest rates were bound to be the same -which turns out to be the case: compare figures 6 and 11. Thus the differential between the NBB's discount rates on 'international' and 'fully domestic' bills should be interpreted as a quality spread: while the first were typically drawn by major merchant bankers, the latter were drawn by small local agents and were thus much riskier assets for the Bank. BdB became purely private concerns, but a major impulse to the financial development of the Brussels place was now given by the newborn NBB -the central bank, whose policies were often influenced by the government. The Bank encouraged the creation of a deep and truly national money market, and provided the necessary infrastructure for the internationalization of the Belgian franc.
To conclude, the success story of 19 th -century Brussels suggests that a general reappraisal of our knowledge about the emergence of financial centres might be wanted. Take the case of those centres whose development followed an apparently 'typical' path: given the role of 
